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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STERLING B. CANNON, GEORGE
H. MAXWELL, DAVE DAVIS, ART
VAN LUYK, and TERRY TEEPLES,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 14378

STEVENS SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS,
INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR RE-HEARING
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF

PETITION FOR RE-HEARING
Stevens Schools of Business, Inc., defendant and appellant herein, respectfully petitions the court for a re-hearing
on the following grounds:
1.

A justice of the court who did not hear the oral

argument should not have participated in the decision.
2.

The court misconceived the facts in stating that

amounts claimed by the plaintiffs were payable from a special
fund.
3.

The court failed to consider the authorities relied

upon by the appellant and failed to decide the primary issue
in the case.

4.

The court's holding with respect to accord and

satisfaction violated accepted principles of contract interpretation.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR RE-HEARING
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by five former employees against
an employer for commissions claimed to have accrued after the
employer ceased doing business.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and against defendant for $35,329.74.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR RE-HEARING
Defendant and appellant asks the court to grant its petition for re-hearing, set the case for reargument, and
reverse the judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs were employed by the defendant as salesmen,
whose duties included visiting various high schools and enrolling students (Tr. 14). In December 1973, the defendant
closed the school it had been operating in Salt Lake City,
and sold the assets of the school it was operating in Ogden.
Thereafter the plaintiffs brought this action claiming they
were entitled to the commissions they would have earned if
the defendant had continued operation of the two schools.
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Prior to the bringing of the action, three of the
plaintiffs had endorsed and cashed checks which were tendered to them in full payment of any claims against the
defendant.
ARGUMENT
I
A justice of the court who did not hear the oral argument
should not have participated in the decision.
In accordance with the rule of the court, oral argument
was requested, and the court convened on December 17, 1976, to
hear the argument.

At that time, the court was composed of

Chief Justice Henriod and Justices Crockett, Ellett, Maughan,
and Wilkins.

Justice Henriod, however, did not participate

in the decision and Justice Hall did.

Article VIII, Section

2, Utah Constitution, provides:
The Supreme Court shall consist of five judges,
which number may be increased or decreased by the
legislature, but no alteration or increase shall have
the effect of removing a judge from office. A majority of the judgdes constituting the court shall be
necessary to form a quorum or render a decision. If
a justice of the Supreme Court shall be disqualified
from sitting in a case before said court, the remaining judges shall call a district judge to sit with
them on the hearing of such cause. * *.* (Emphasis added)
At the time of the argument, Cheif Justice Henriod had
announced his retirement from the court, and it might have been
anticipated that he would not participate in the decision.

That

being the case, he should have disqualified himself from sitting
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and the court should have followed the mandate of Article VIII,
Section 2, and appointed a district judge to sit with them on
the hearing of the case.
The failure to appoint a district judge deprived the appellant of the right to have all of the judges participate in the
decision-making process, and in the give and take following
oral argument of the cause.

For this reason, the court should

grant a petition for re-hearing and permit the parties to
argue the case before all of the justices who will participate
in the decision.
1 1

The court misconceived the facts in stating that amounts
claimed by the plaintiffs were payable from a special fund.
In its opinion, this court cited Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.
v. Moore, 170 Colo. 539, 463 P.2d 460, 462 (1970), in support of the proposition that where compensation for services
rendered is to be paid out of a fund to be collected by the
party for whom such services were rendered "there is an
implied obligation on the part of the promisor to exercise
reasonable diligence to collect the fund from which the
promisees may be compensated for such services."
The Navajo Freight Line case is not in point.

In that

case the defendant had agreed to pay his auditors a percentage
of the additional accounts receivable collected as a result of
certain work done by the auditors.

••.".•':•'"
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The auditors brought

suit seeking recovery of a percentage of all of the accounts
that it had retrieved for the defendant to collect.

The

court, in passing, recited the language set out above, but
held for the defendant.
In this case there was no fund which the defendant had
any right to collect.

The student enrollments taken by the

defendant were quarter-by-quarter, and there was no indebtedness owed by any of the students for whom the plaintiffs seek
compensation.

Therefore the "special fund" concept has no

application to this case.
Moreover, the court states bluntly that the action of the
defendant in suspending the schools was "voluntary."

This is

a question of fact which should be sent to the trial court for
determination.

The voluntariness of the defendant's action is

subject to serious dispute.

During the year 197 3, the year

the Salt Lake City school was closed and the Ogden school
sold, the defendant had suffered an operational loss of $143,000
(Tr. 262). Closing the doors of the schools under these circumstances can hardly be considered to be "voluntary," but should
be deemed to be compelled by the force of circumstances over
which the defendant had no control.

At the very least, this

is an issue that should be given back to the trial court for
a finding.
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Ill
The court failed to consider the authorities relied upon
by the appellant and failed to decide the primary issue in the
case.

\ .

In presenting this case to the court, the defendant relied
on a series of cases that were directly in point.

People of

the State of Illinois v. Peoria Life Insurance Co. (Harwick v.
O'Hern), 376 111. 517, 34 N.E.2d 829, 136 A.L.R. 151 (1941);
Layton v. Illinois Life Insurance Co. (Backman v. Davis), 81
F.2d 600 (7 Cir. 1936); Moore v. Security Trust and Life
Insurance Company, 168 F 496 (8 Cir. 1909); and others.
The above cases dealt specifically with the primary
issue in this case: whether a company which has promised
renewal commissions to salesmen is obligated to continue to
pay those commissions if the company goes out of business.
As pointed out by the court in Moore v. Security Trust and
Life Insurance Company:
The existence of this right in the defendant [to
manage, control, continue, or terminate its business
at will] and its free and continuous exercise were implied in this contract of agency, and the plaintifffs
took the chances of its exercise when they signed the
agreement and entered upon their service under it.
In writing its decision this court ignored the whole
theory upon which the defendant's appeal was based, and in
so doing it did not mention a single one of the cases upon
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which the defendant relied, let alone attempt to distinguish
them or show the basis for their non-applicability.

Instead,

the court relied upon some general but inappropriate language
about excuse of conditions and voluntary acts*
'

•

•

•

I

V

'

The court's holding with respect to accord and satisfaction violated accepted principles of contract interpretation.
In ruling upon the issue of accord and satisfaction,
the court announced a rule which will have the effect of
returning litigants to the era of Groucho Marx, where they
win the prize only if they happen to say the magic word.
Checks sent to three of the plaintiffs contained the
following endorsements:
Endorsement of this check constitutes acknowledgement of the termination effective 12-31-73, of my employment agreement with Stevens-Henager College dated
[date], and constitutes final and full payment by
Stevens-Henager College to me in settlement of any and
all obligation due me from Stevens-Henager College,
(Emphasis added)
Citing Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 283, 437 P.2d
202 (1968), the court stated that:
Neither by the
other communication
tention the payment
that it be accepted
all.

statement on the check or by
did defendant express the inwas offered upon the condition
in full satisfaction or not at
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In the present case, the only way it could have been
plainer that the check was tendered in full satisfaction or
not at all would have been to add the magic words, "This
check may be accepted only in full satisfaction or not at
all."

But rules of contract interpretation have never

required statements of that type if the intent of the parties,
viewed objectively, can be gleaned from the language used.
The standard of interpretation of unintegrated agreements
is set out in 1 Restatement of Contracts, § 233 as follows:
Where there is no integration, words or other manifestations of intention forming an agreement, or
having reference to the formation of an agreement,
are given the meaning which the party making the
manifestation should reasonably expect that the
other party would give them * * *
Under the provisions of 1 Restatement of Contracts,
§ 231, the rule of interpretation applies to integrated
agreements, also, where they are ambiguous or uncertain.
It is difficult to conceive how any reasonable, objective, person could read the endorsement placed on the check
by the defendant without coming the conclusion that the
defendant intended that if the check were cashed, all disputes and claims as between the parties would be fully
compromised and settled.

The language is quite unlike that

in Hintze v. Seaich where a check was sent to the plaintiff
with a statement that "this is the balance of your account
in full."

That statement can be interpreted as a simple

statement of expectation by the one party, but not clearly
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a statement that the check is tendered only on condition
that it be accepted in full settlement.

The endorsement

placed on the checks in this case by the defendant cannot be'
interpreted in any other way.

"Endorsement * * * consti-

tutes final and full payment * * * in settlement of any and
all obligations due me from Stevens-Henager College."

How

could it be clearer?
Moreover, the evidence is that the plaintiffs knew
exactly what the contracts meant.

In holding the contrary,

the court relies upon the findings of the trial court, but
pays no attention to the testimony of the plaintiffs.

The

addition of modifying language by two of the plaintiffs is
pretty clear evidence that they knew what the defendant was
saying.

Two of the plaintiffs changed the language on the

endorsement, the other one endorsed the check and presented
it for payment believing that he had additional claims for
commissions against the defendant (Tr. 229). Mr. Teeples
testified that he took the endorsement to be an attempt on
the part of Stevens to wipe out the sums of future commissions
(Tr. 189).
Accordingly we not only have a situation in which the
language used by the defendant was clear and unequivocal, but
one in which the plaintiffs who cashed the checks understood
what the defendant was saying, understood it as defendant
understood it, and should be bound by it.
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CONCLUSION
Because the case was erroneously decided, the court misconceived the facts, and because one of the justices who
participated in the decision did not hear the oral argument,
a re-hearing should be granted and the judgment of the trial
court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
8

H«e E. Roe (Signadj

Bryce E. Roe
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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